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2015年10月24日 (土)

日立製作所の工作員と鍵穴が、また理由にならん理由を言うてきたぞ。

内閣府を使って、私に工作してきてさえも、私のコトが怖いんやな。
インラインで回答する。用事があるからできるとこまで。

http://onicchan.cocolog-nifty.com/blog/2015/10/post-3717.html#comment-111948708

全く変わるけど、新幹線って全電気ブレーキにはできんの?
2015/10/16 18:57

大西君さあ、やろうと思えば一応可能だよね。
新幹線の場合はブレーキ使用回数が在来線よりも少ないこと、ブレーキ距離が延びるのを防ぐために 、車輪とレールが接触する面を清掃する車輪踏面清掃装置を定期的に使用したいがこれは 、空気ブレーキ使用時にしか動作しないこと、新型車では主要機器の冷却に列車の走行風を使用するようになっていて全電気ブレーキを採用すると機器の排熱が苦しくなることなどが、 全電気ブレーキが採用されない理由。

それと、今の新幹線ってかなりの低速域まで回生ブレーキです。

これがプロの回答。

わかった?


投稿: | 2015年10月24日 (土) 00時30分

* 技術論に走っとるなあ。

* 私がどうして全電気ブレーキにと言うたかは、ある車種の停止時のブレーキ音が、
* 苦情が出るほど大きいこと。

* 騒音対策って、何にも増して必要。
* やり直し。


日立製作所工作員くん、論点ずらし乙。もともと回生失効が主題ではなくブス引き通しの必要性やわなあ。
2015/10/21 15:08

ブス引き通しに関して、回生失効は検討に値しない。→回生失効の件はギブアップですか
2015/10/21 5:49:06

大西君さあ、ブス引き通しは離線対策。
電車線セクションオーバーを無くすには新幹線並みのダブルセクション化が必要。
パンタ1個(2連)なのにエアーセクションオーバーしちゃった例もあるから、 信号とかでは防げない。
ダブルセクション化しかない

* エアセクションオーバーって、調べたけど変電所間短絡やろ?
*
* ならば変電所間短絡せん方法を考えたらええだけやん。
* しかも、ブス引き通しの理由がブレブレなんやけど、
* そもそも在来線でどういうときに離線が起こるか言うてみ?

* そして、ブス引き通しが山手線の半数の車両にしか適用されてないのは
* どう説明するよ?

* 鴨居部のモニタだって、最初は山手線スペシャルのハズで入ったのに、
* いろんな車両に展開しとるよなあ。

* ではどうしてブス引き通しは広がらんの?
* 私は、効果がないからと見るなあ。


後、ATO路線で手動運転するとき、停車にもの凄い神経使って疲れるって現職から聞いたぞ。

わかった?
投稿: | 2015年10月24日 (土) 00時53分

* ATOとかTASCは、それだけ精度がいい運転を自動でできる例として語ってきた。
* 停止時のパンタの離線もブス引き通しの理由にはならん。
*
* ATO路線で手動運転のハナシを出してきたら、停止時のパンタの離線が
* ブス引き通しの理由にならんことを自分から白状しとることになるんやけど・・・
*
* 知識をひけらかすのではなく、議論の内容に即して回答しよう。


大西君さあ、ブス引き通しするなら仙台の地下鉄みたいなダブルセクションとセットじゃないとね。

わかった?

地下鉄と言えば、集電靴は左右でつながっているので、 第三軌条と反対側の集電靴に触れて感電する事故があり得るんだよね。

投稿: | 2015年10月24日 (土) 01時05分

* 仙台の地下鉄とやらも、要らん設備投資しとるんやなあw

* それと、集電靴ってせいぜい1,500Vとかやろ?
* 仮に触れても、集電靴~車輪~レールのほうが抵抗低いから、感電せんのとちゃう?

* 残りは午後


工作員がホームドアについて書いてきとる。TASCってATOなしでホームドアだけの場合になんで要るん?
2015/10/19 22:18

大西君さあ、ホームドアの設置が進まないのは基礎工事もそうだけど、ホームドアの更新時の費用と聞いたけど。

新規の設置は補助が出るけど、更新時は鉄道会社が全額負担する。 
だから各社は二の足を踏んでるんだよ。

わかった?
投稿: | 2015年10月24日 (土) 01時12分
私ふと、新幹線の切替セクションについて勘違いしとるんちゃうか?と思った。以下にストーリーを示す。
2015/09/30 21:00

大西君さあ、新幹線のき電区分所の仕組みは1964年の開業当時からのもの 。

変電所間が短絡しないよう一旦電源を切断して0.1~0.3秒後に別系統の電源に切り替えて 、再度電源を投入するという仕組みで(列車の位置は軌道回路で検知)電源の短絡をしない以外は 、
大西君の提案の仕組みとだいたい同じ

電力会社から送電されてきた三相交流を鉄道の交流電化で使用する単相交流に変換する段階で 、電圧波形がずれた2組の単相交流が出力されていて、これを短絡させると大規模なアーク放電が発生して 
電線が溶け落ちるので、き電区分所では相互の絶縁が必要となってる 。
(1組だけ送電すると電力会社側の電力波形に影響が出て大規模な停電を招いたりする要因となるので 上下線別あるいは起点方・終点方に分けて必ず2組とも送電している)

東海道新幹線で車両への高圧引き通しが可能になったのはBTき電からATき電に切り替えるのに合わせて 、それまで上下線別に送電していたものを起点方・終点方に分けて送電するように改めたことによるもの 。

切り換え前は上下線間が短絡しないようにされていたのでパンタ間の引き通しも設置できなかった 。

電池は重たいので、重量制限ギリギリの今の新幹線には載せる余裕がないんですよ 。

そのうち改良されていくと思いますけど 。

あと新技術がなかなか導入されない理由に値段がありますね 。
ほとんどの場合、どっちが安上がりか考えて導入してますから 。

わかった?
投稿: | 2015年10月24日 (土) 01時29分
>運転士の力量を信じてTASC未導入でホームドア入れてもいいと思う。

>韓国なんて日本よりもホームドア発達しとるけど、TASCなんて入れてないやろ。

大西君さあ、安全に対する意識が低くいんじゃない?
安全基準も整備されていない新興国の対応よりも 、大西君よりできる人達が考えて企画した 、可動柵に対するTASCでの停止精度確保が絶対に正しい 。
投稿: | 2015年10月24日 (土) 01時37分
ハンダイなんて、クソの役にもたたんわ。
2015/10/18 10:42

大西君さあ、ハンダイ卒の君は役にたたなかったけど、ハンダイ卒の田野君は役にたってるよ。

投稿: | 2015年10月24日 (土) 01時47分


https://ja.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E4%B8%8A%E4%B8%8B%E5%88%86%E9%9B%A2%E6%96%B9%E5%BC%8F
はい、残念でした。日本でも上下分離方式はとられています。
素人の私が簡単に調べただけですぐに見つかるのに、思い込みで決めつけてしまうのはいけませんねえ。

投稿: 鍵穴 | 2015年10月23日 (金) 23時02分


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ハンダイなんて、クソの役にもたたんわ。 2015/10/18 10:42 大西君さあ、ハンダイ卒の君は役にたたなかったけど、ハンダイ卒の田野君は役にたっ...
日本で鉄道の上下分離は行われるか? (記事)
15/10/24
>運転士の力量を信じてTASC未導入でホームドア入れてもいいと思う。 >韓国なんて日本よりもホームドア発達しとるけど、TASCなんて入れてないやろ。 ...
日本で鉄道の上下分離は行われるか? (記事)
15/10/24
私ふと、新幹線の切替セクションについて勘違いしとるんちゃうか?と思った。以下にストーリーを示す。 2015/09/30 21:00 大西君さあ、新幹線の...
日本で鉄道の上下分離は行われるか? (記事)
15/10/24
工作員がホームドアについて書いてきとる。TASCってATOなしでホームドアだけの場合になんで要るん? 2015/10/19 22:18 大西君さあ、ホー...
日本で鉄道の上下分離は行われるか? (記事)
15/10/24
大西君さあ、ブス引き通しするなら仙台の地下鉄みたいなダブルセクションとセットじゃないとね。 わかった? 地下鉄と言えば、集電靴は左右でつながっている...
日本で鉄道の上下分離は行われるか? (記事)
15/10/24
日立製作所工作員くん、論点ずらし乙。もともと回生失効が主題ではなくブス引き通しの必要性やわなあ。 2015/10/21 15:08 ブス引き通しに関して...
日本で鉄道の上下分離は行われるか? (記事)
15/10/24
全く変わるけど、新幹線って全電気ブレーキにはできんの? 2015/10/16 18:57 大西君さあ、やろうと思えば一応可能だよね。 新幹線の場合はブ...
日本で鉄道の上下分離は行われるか? (記事)
15/10/24

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大西君さあ、ヒト・モノ・カネを無視して理想を語るのは学生までだよ。

そんなんだから毎回"B判定"なんだよ。

私の方が忙しいけど、また暇な時に答えてあげるよ。

わかった?大西後輩君

大西ひでぶさあ また工作員って決めつけて頭おかしいのかな? ほんとお前ってアホだよなあ。今日はミスすんなよ。誰でも出来る仕事なのにお前はミスばかりするよなあ

大西君さあ"エアーセクションオーバー"を調べないと分からないとは・・・

本当に日立に10年いたの?
何やってたのよ?

しっかりして下さいよ、
ツルピカポークビッツ大西君

おーにっちゃんさあ、
君はアキブータン?とやらののアイディアに操られてるだけだよね(笑)
せめてAKBを超えるアイドルグループをプロデュースできるようにならなきゃ、おーにっちゃんポリシーには説得力が無い

それが分かるまでは、五流ナマポ人レベルのままだよなあ(笑)

はい、おーにっちゃんマンセー!

大西さんに餌やり今日も頑張ります

大西さんが音痴である件について。
カラオケ採点の場合、始めの音がズレていたら機械の側がある程度修正して採点してくれます。ですから音程が正しい証拠にはなりませんし、音痴でない根拠にもなりません。
ボイストレーナーさんもプロ指導ではないカラオケ指導に厳しいこと言わないですね。動画の大西さんを見る限り、おそらく「音程は(まあ)あっている(けど、顔も声も気持ち悪いし、リズム感も声の伸びも無い。絶望的に不愉快だなあ)」と言ってましたね。

お前、大好きなAKB(笑)のイベントに行けなくて欲求不満なんだな。
メンバーに結婚を迫って出入り禁止だし、行く金もないんだろ。
40の禿げたおっさんがAKB(笑)なんかに嵌っているのは気持ち悪い。
早く卒業しろよ。
秋元にごっつい資金を提供すればメンバーを貸してもらえて好きに出来るだろうけどな。
干されたらAVに出たりフーゾクやるような連中なんだし。

> 仙台の地下鉄とやらも〜略〜

大西君さあ、第三軌条はせいぜい750Vだよ。
モノレールの場合は集電靴じゃなくて、パンタグラフだから新しい路線は1500Vが多いけど。

でも、直流で大電流の場合は42Vが「死にボルト」と言われる。
実質50V以下だとしても十分危険。

わかった?大西後輩君?

> 私がどうして全電気ブレーキにと言うたかは、ある車種の停止時のブレーキ音が、 苦情が出るほど大きいこと。

大西君さあ、"全電気ブレーキ"って日立の社員ぽいなあ。

電磁直通ブレーキ特有の音の事かな?
大西君はさあ、"パシャーン"って何故鳴るか理解してるの?説明できるの?

wiki丸々引用とかならB判定だよ、大西後輩君

大西君さあ、やっぱり君の答えは反論のための反論、屁理屈も屁理屈で正直読む気にならないんだよ。あれれ?上下分離方式についての君の間違いに対する謝罪と感謝の言葉がないんだけどなあ?こういうところはあの頃と変わらないな。
てか、兄貴にマジで登山オススメしたい。ナマポをフル活用して最終的に百名山を制覇しよう兄貴!登山家おーにっちゃん、受給者おーにっちゃん、さあどっちがカッコイイか?

おっと、こちら側も面倒くさくなっていろんなキャラをだしてしまったぞwもうどうでもいいから教えてあげると、みんな"僕”だからね。書き込み事に複数端末キャリアのデータ通信、Wi-Fi、デザリング、野良Wi-Fiを使っていただけで、みんな僕なんだ。ストーリー、崩れちゃったかな。


おーにっちゃんさあ、やっぱり僕の佐々木に対する反論には答えられなかったんだね。焦って高速鉄道()の話で話題をそらした時は必ず直前の話題はなかったことにしているよね。つまり、高速鉄道()は君の敗北宣言なんだよなあ。おーにっちゃんさあ、分かるだろ?案の定、僕の話は答えられずに逃げて、鉄道話をしてあげたら食いついてきた。おーにっちゃんはいつも逃げてばかりなんだよなあ。たまには逃げずに答えてくれよ。
そうそう、ちなみにあの回答は全て鉄道faqからのコピペだぞ。

これからも色んなキャラで遊んであげるw


内閣府を使って工作とは、この前の答申のことですか?大西さん、なぜ不開示になったのかちゃんと理解してます?
情報公開法では個人情報が含まれる文書は開示できないことになっていますので(同法5条1号本文)、開示できなくて当たり前なんです。大西さん本人も個人情報が含まれると認めている文書を開示したら、それこそ違法なんですよ。

個人情報を含む文書を見たい場合は行政機関個人情報保護法12条1項に基づく開示請求をすれば足ります。ちなみに、決定に不服がある場合は42条に基づき行政不服申立てとして内閣府の委員会に諮問してもらえますし、それとは別に行政訴訟法に基づく取消し訴訟等ももちろん可能です。

法律とその構造をしっかり理解しましょうね。

내일 같이 등산 하러 타카오산에 갈수 있어요? 

오오니시를 불러 등산하러 가자

후지산에 갑니까

FEW investors come in more belligerent form than Daniel Loeb, an American activist shareholder known for attacking lacklustre chief executives in the most personal of terms. Yet Mr Loeb has lately found a second home in Japan, a country where shareholders with opinions have hitherto been about as welcome as skunks at a garden party.

Late last year Mr Loeb’s fund, Third Point, took a stake in Fanuc, a secretive and highly profitable robotics firm which until recently seldom made direct contact with its investors, choosing instead to hoard a vast and expanding pile of cash. No one expected Mr Loeb’s gambit to succeed. In the past, successive waves of investors have tried to encourage Fanuc to change its ways, only to throw in the towel, usually at a loss. So the firm’s surprise news in March, that it would start talking to shareholders and return some of its cash to them, reverberated far and wide.

Mr Loeb has since taken tea with Fanuc’s president, Yoshiharu Inaba, at its headquarters in the foothills of Mount Fuji. He is receiving further encouragement from the very top of government. He has had private meetings with Shinzo Abe, the prime minister, with Taro Aso, the finance minister, and with Haruhiko Kuroda, governor of the Bank of Japan. “Can you imagine him getting in to see David Cameron or Angela Merkel?” remarks a friend in Tokyo. “Third Point loves it here.”

Such signals from the apex of the establishment, in a place where business heeds the government more than in perhaps any other big democracy, have not gone unnoticed among corporate leaders. And the government is offering more than gestures. On June 1st its new corporate-governance code came into effect, with the aim of shaking up companies’ slothful boards by, for instance, calling on them to appoint outsiders (many have none at present). This is the first time a Japanese government has laid down detailed rules on how firms should conduct their affairs.

Mr Abe’s attempts to make companies change their ways are one element of Abenomics, his grand plan to restore vim to the Japanese economy. The corporate reforms, along with monetary easing by the Bank of Japan, are the most tangible elements so far of the prime minister’s programme. His government has stood up to pressure from the Keidanren, Japan’s biggest business lobby, which tried its best to get the code watered down.

The code for companies follows another, for institutional investors, that came into force last year, which seems to be emboldening them to make demands on companies to improve their returns. The Tokyo Stock Exchange is also seeking to shame the laggards into action, with a new index of well-behaved firms. The reforms seem to have captured the public mood: books with titles like “Changing Japan, the Poorest Nation for Return-on-Equity” are flying off the shelves.

A prized skill for leaders in Japan lies in being able to “read the air”, or to sense what is important but unstated. What is in the air now, reckon foreign and Japanese investors alike, is nothing less than a revolution in companies’ attitude to both shareholders and returns. This, in turn, should prompt them to think hard about their strategies. The companies, like Fanuc, that have begun to change their ways are so far the exceptions rather than the rule, but their numbers are growing.

Dazzling no more

Change is undoubtedly needed. Japan’s post-war economic miracle produced firms such as Sony and Sharp that dazzled the world, yet today many of them have lost direction. In consumer electronics and appliances they have been left behind by the likes of Apple of the United States, Samsung of South Korea and Haier of China. For years, Japanese firms of all kinds have lagged behind those in the West on such measures as profitability and return on equity (see chart 1). Instead of investing their modest profits wisely, to expand their businesses—or at least handing them back to investors so they can reinvest the money elsewhere—many companies have sat on growing piles of cash.

To be sure, Japan can still produce firms such as Uniqlo, a seemingly unstoppable fashion retailer; and its strongest companies, such as Keyence, which makes high-precision measuring equipment, can still be world leaders in their industries. Yet the country’s few technology startups have underwhelmed. Indeed, there are few signs of entrepreneurship in the world’s third-largest economy. Only 4% of the working population was engaged in starting a business last year, compared with 14% in America, according to the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, compiled by the London Business School and Babson College. The dearth of entrepreneurship inside large firms is no less of a problem.

Among established companies, a sense of crisis over mounting losses and tumbling global market share is already prompting some to think more clearly about their business portfolios. Panasonic has boldly shifted focus from consumer electronics, in which it was struggling, to supplying components for cars and energy-efficient homes. A bevy of firms have gone on overseas acquisition sprees.

More companies are abandoning a tradition of always appointing their next boss from among time-serving insiders, and looking outside—or even abroad. Last year Suntory, a drinks firm, made waves by appointing its first boss from outside the firm, choosing Takeshi Niinami, a Harvard-educated executive previously at Lawson, a retailer. And Takeda, a drugmaker, chose Christophe Weber, a Frenchman, as its new head. Foreign bosses are not unknown at Japanese firms: Nissan, a carmaker, is run by Carlos Ghosn, a Brazilian, and Sony was for several years run by Howard Stringer, a Welshman. But they are becoming less uncommon.

There is no firm that better embodies the results that reform can achieve than Hitachi. It was formerly one of Japan’s most conservative: the consummate “community” firm, at which employees and their families, and suppliers and their dependents, all took precedence over shareholders. In 2008 it notched up the largest loss on record by a Japanese manufacturer. Since then it has spun off its consumer-related businesses in flat-panel TVs, mobile phones and computer parts to refocus on selling infrastructure such as power plants and railway systems. More recently Hitachi has made efforts to change its internal culture. Last year it all but abandoned one of the central pillars of Japanese business: the seniority-wage system, in which salaries are based on age and length of service rather than on performance. The results of all this have been stellar. Its operating profits in the year to March rose by 12% to ¥600 billion ($5 billion).

Now, says Kathy Matsui of Goldman Sachs in Tokyo, stockmarket investors are all searching for the next Hitachi. Activists and private-equity firms are sensing an opening up of opportunities. Seth Fischer, an activist investor, says the government’s backing makes all the difference when it comes to shaking up firms. He is preparing to take on two industrial giants, Canon, a camera-maker, and Kyocera, an electronics and ceramics manufacturer, over their complex corporate structures.

The growing proportion of shares in Japan’s listed companies owned by foreigners (see chart 2) has undoubtedly added to the pressure on firms to change. But it is not just foreigners who are making the running. Early this year the country was transfixed by the spectacle of an elderly corporate patriarch and business founder seeking to oust his daughter from the top of the family’s furniture firm, Otsuka Kagu. Kumiko Otsuka had defied her father by bringing in outside directors to sit alongside family members on the firm’s board. There is no doubt, says Ms Otsuka, that her success in staying on as president was in part down to the altered attitudes on corporate governance. The institutional investors who backed her in the fight might otherwise have sat on their votes.

Stooping to conquer

Many companies that are not yet ready for an internal revolution are at least making some efforts to appease newly empowered investors, by buying back shares or lifting their dividends. The total value of share buy-backs rose to ¥3.7 trillion in 2014, the highest level since the global financial crisis in 2008. For several giants, including Mitsui, a trading house, and Toray Industries, a textiles and chemicals group, it is the first time that they have ever stooped to conquer shareholder approval in this way. Investors have responded by lifting the total value of companies listed on the main board of the Tokyo Stock Exchange to match its former peak in 1989.

The government’s aim is certainly far more ambitious than getting firms to distribute some of their vast cash piles. It wants to see Japanese industry regaining its global competitiveness. One important reason for the slippage has been quiescent boards. Although Japanese boards are no longer the charade they might have been in the past, says George Olcott, a seasoned director who currently sits on several of them, too few conduct a proper debate on the company’s strategy, and too many still see their main purpose as simply ratifying decisions already taken by management. The new corporate-governance code will oblige firms to employ at least two outside directors on their boards, and gives those boards explicit duties to scrutinise the work of managers and communicate with shareholders.

Just as important is the code brought in last year for pension funds and other institutional investors, which aims to transform them from supine rentiers into responsible stewards. The code, which is modelled on Britain’s, tells fund managers to engage in active discussion with companies’ boards about their strategy and performance, and to publish information on how they voted at shareholder meetings.

There are grounds for hope that big investors will do their bit. To give them further impetus, early this year Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), an adviser to foreign fund managers and some Japanese ones, recommended that funds vote against the managers of any firms in Japan that had failed to notch up an average return on equity of at least 5% over the last five years. (It had planned to set the bar at 8%, but since the five-year average was just 4.6% last summer, when the measure was being discussed, companies fought hard to lower it.)

Some Japanese life insurers, which have hitherto been especially loth to speak out on poor performance, say they will adopt return-on-equity targets for firms they invest in. One of the largest, Nippon Life, says it will use ISS’s 5% benchmark. Since around a quarter of the 1,891 firms in the Topix index currently fail to achieve it, their bosses could face significant votes against them in the annual shareholder-meeting season, later this month. Many chief executives are feeling vulnerable, says Ms Matsui of Goldman Sachs.

Some institutional investors, most notably the vast Government Pension Investment Fund, say they will pay special attention to the “shame index” introduced last year by the Tokyo Stock Exchange, which includes the 400 best companies as measured by return on equity and some other factors. To avoid the embarrassment of being left out of the index, the bosses of some big firms have scrambled to enact changes. Amada, a toolmaker, promised to return its entire net profits to shareholders for the next two years.

But it would be deeply disappointing, says Mr Niinami of Suntory—one of the architects of Japan’s new corporate-governance framework—if companies restricted themselves to simply re-engineering their balance-sheets through such things as buy-backs, while failing to tackle the underlying reasons for their poor performance. One such is the tangle of stakes that companies hold in other companies, which help protect many ailing firms from takeover (as well as disadvantaging minority investors). These, and Japan’s hitherto hostile attitude to shareholder rights, mean that mergers are a lot less common than in countries like America and Britain (see chart 3). As a result, many industries are fragmented and inefficient.

Companies must rationalise their unwieldy structures and put their cash hoards to work, says Mr Niinami. If they have not embarked on these tasks by 2020, he says, their competitiveness may be eroded beyond the point of no return.

Perhaps the hardest reforms of all for Japanese firms will be those involving the way they manage people. Changing this is one of the main aims of the government’s new corporate-governance rules, says Yasuhisa Shiozaki, the minister of health and labour. Companies have long argued that it is unreasonable for the government to expect them to post dizzy shareholder returns while they are unable by law to lay off excess workers. Corporate Japan in effect forms part of the country’s welfare state, by keeping on more staff than are needed. Some of the “zombie” firms and subsidiaries kept alive through cross-shareholdings and keiretsu, or informal business groupings, exist mainly to provide places to park unneeded workers.

For all its reforming zeal in other areas, there is so far little sign that the government of Mr Abe will move swiftly to make it easier to lay off staff. And even if labour laws were changed, there would be a huge cultural barrier to overcome: since companies currently get rid of permanent staff only in the most dire circumstances, they will be reluctant to shed surplus workers in case their customers and suppliers get the impression that they are indeed in desperate straits.

Japanese firms have clung to their traditions of lifetime employment in a single workplace, and of paying and promoting people according to seniority, because they believe those traditions have merits. Indeed, they foster loyalty, and thereby encourage firms to invest in training graduates without fear of them being poached by rivals, argues Yoshito Hori, the founder of GLOBIS, a business school. However, it is no way to produce the sort of managers needed to lead modern, knowledge-based industries. “Imagine if you took managers at Apple, Google and Amazon and replaced them with people promoted on the basis of length of service rather than merit,” says Atul Goyal, an analyst at Jefferies, a stockbroker. “How long do you think those companies would last?”

Young and frustrated

The voice of Japan’s young workers, who are generally underpaid and underpromoted, recently found an outlet in a surprise hit television drama, set in a fictional version of Japan’s largest bank. Much of the country seemed to identify powerfully with the show’s talented hero, Naoki Hanzawa, a loan manager, who kicks back against the bank’s higher-ups and refuses to take the blame, as Japanese corporate culture dictates he ought, for the bosses’ many profit-destroying blunders.

Hitachi’s salarymen are similarly cheering the firm’s shift to performance-related pay and promotion. If you are in your late 40s you might be nervous, since the ascent of the corporate ladder now comes with some uncertainty, says one. But younger hires are ecstatic. It won’t even matter as much if you went to the wrong university as long as you work hard, exults another employee. Panasonic, Sony and Toyota are also moving towards more performance-related pay and promotion.

Those who plod their way to the top of Japanese firms tend too often to be conservative and narrow-minded. The way they are rewarded does not provide much incentive to try hard: not only is their pay smaller than that of their peers in other developed economies, it is less tied to their performance (see chart 4). When it comes to aligning the interests of bosses and shareholders, Japan is stuck roughly in the 1970s, says Jesper Koll, an economist and adviser to the government.

Although a few firms are beginning to change, it will take years for ambitious youngsters to thrust their way upwards through the layers of hierarchy. In the meantime, Japan Inc remains in the grip of lifetime salarymen who rose in the traditional way. And this is what advocates of better corporate governance, more investment and more risk-taking in Japan worry about most of all: roughly half of the present leaders of large blue-chip firms should be turfed out, argues one pro-reform boss.

It is not yet certain that corporate Japan has the will to take the drastic steps that are needed to restore its competitiveness. Grounds for scepticism are plentiful. The last great effort to open up firms to outside capital and takeovers, in the 1990s and early 2000s, petered out as the establishment closed ranks following the departure of Junichiro Koizumi, an earlier reform-minded prime minister. This time, at least, the government is having success in getting Japanese institutional investors and companies on board. However talented and determined Mr Loeb and other foreign activists are, it will be locals who decide whether the changed atmosphere on corporate performance is merely fleeting, or an irreversible change.

>騒音対策って、何にも増して必要。

大西君さあ、騒音対策なら合成制輪子とディスクブレーキの使用で約半減に出来るよね。
しかし、コスト負担が大きいのがねぇ。

その他、車輪への吸音材の装備やレールと車輪の適切な研削方策で騒音を低減できる。

世の中、大西君みたいな"クレーマー"ばかりじゃない。

そうだろ?ツルピカポークビッツ大西君?

大西君さあ、君が上司を"ブツブツミートボール"と呼ぶなら、
その上司の部下(下僕)の君は

"ツルピカポークビッツ"なんだよ。

わかる?

このブログを開設しているとされる「大西」なる人物は実在しているのでしょうか?
もし実在の人物とすると、このブログを開設しているのはその「大西」なる人物の評判を貶めるための成りすましの仕業である可能性が高いと思います。

このように、本人の無知をさらけ出すような記事は本人だったら決して書かないと思います。
本物の「大西」なる人物が、日立製作所に勤務している(したことのある?)鉄道の専門家だとすると、このブログの主はまったくの素人の別人であることが明らかだからです。

大西君さあ、

まさかスコットトランスって知っているよね。
鉄道の専門家で、日立製作所にいた大西さんだものね。

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